Thursday, May 1, 2008

The Provocateur is wrong! Someone is wrong on the internet!

[Title explained here]

A blog out there, found through RealClearPolitics, is titled 'The Provocateur.' Today he writes against Mary Mitchell, apparently an inflammatory African-American columnist for the Chicago Sun Times. What did she say that incenses us so?
This is a sad day for Black America.
At a time when African Americans
are on the cusp of watching a barrier come crashing down, up jumps a
divisive issue that is being driven by those outside of the black
community.Obviously, Wright's timing for a press conference about his sermons couldn't have been worse. Still, when Obama
says he is "offended" by Wright's latest comments -- given in defense
against an orchestrated assault on his character and on his ministry --
he's opening up a can of worms. There is no institution in the
black community more respected than the black church. And the notion
that white pundits can dictate what constitutes unacceptable speech in
the black church is repulsive to most black people.

Let me say this: I understand both sides of the issue here. Of course some in the black community see Obama's candidacy as a breakthrough, and the possibility of it being undone when he's gone so far arouses resentment. I also see that others, often outside the black community, would see the kind of rhetoric Mary Mitchell uses as too heavily race-based or divisive. But what our kindly Provocateur does is to make the wrong move about this. Instead he does the old "let's flip the races and see if it sounds like the KKK" gambit.

I could do the easy thing and say "Why doesn't anyone complain about Asian, Jewish, Italian, Irish, German organizations? Why is it black organizations? There are groups advocating the same solidarity within Jewish and Chinese communities today, as well as others I don't know about. If the problem is with self-segregation, which you say it is, then you will now denounce these groups publicly."

Now that I've said the easy thing I'm going to say the hard thing. The reason that any group exerts pressure is that it's a minority. Majority groups make the situation against which pressure groups move. Majority groups have their system and their values normalized by virtue of being the majority.

Black Americans have to contend with a totally different power dynamic. That is why it is acceptable for Mary Mitchell to speak as she does. It matters how both sides see the problem involved. Provocateur sees it as separationist. I am not comfortable with the part that appears too ready to blame deliberate malice on the part of the white community. Yet there is also the other side of Mitchell's statement which comes from a long history of power imbalance between black and white communities. If you think that power imbalance ended with the Civil Rights Act, you are sorely mistaken. Even if every racist law in the country was struck down tomorrow there is the amorphous cultural power where Black America can in no way present a legitimate challenge.

It's not up to me, or the Provocateur, to say "Mary Mitchell is a racist" or "Mary Mitchell is a legitimate spokesperson for the black community". It is important to note that simply swapping the races in her comment cannot prove it is unacceptable because 'caucasians' do not have the history that correctly contextualizes the comment. I reject the 'race-swap' tactic in all its forms because it assumes that race relations develop in a historical vacuum and that any group can be substituted for any other. This is not true, and so the tactic is illegitimate.

Religions based in Fear (FSTDT)

Browsing around Fundies Say The Darndest Things, I found this quote:
For many years, I've been tip-toeing through life, afraid that if I
make the wrong move, God will punish me horribly. Whether or not that
is theologically accurate, I do not know. But it's like everytime I do
something that I think might be bad in some way, no matter how small it
is, I start thinking "Please God, don't hurt me. Just don't hurt me!"
It's just gotten worse in the last year or so, and I don't want to live
my life in utter misery and constant fear of God spiritually hitting me
over the head. Any advice?
The commentators who critiqued this quote were pretty hostile. A sampling:
  • You have no idea of theology.

  • Get therapy for paranoia and religious indoctrination.

  • Yes. stop believing that God will hurt you. God never will.

  • A perfect example of how effective religion can be at controlling people through fear.
For all these commentators, fear is not a legitimate aspect of religion. Must are antagonistic, but the third espouses a God that is sympathetic. Is fear just tangential to the process of religion, or is this 'Fundie' onto something?

Some time ago, I watched a documentary on North Korea on the National Geographic channel (which now refers to itself in a too-hip manner as 'NatGeo'). This is solely my opinion, but based on what I have heard and read in books, the internet, television and news reports I believe North Korea is the most oppressive regime and governmental system in the history of humanity. I believe that it has, more than any other organization since time began, come close to actually controlling the thoughts and actions of its citizens as much as is possible.

It is supposedly communist, but not in a way Marx might recognize. The official philosophy is 'Juche' - self reliance - which means North Koreans are doin' it for themselves, mostly. This means that crop failures inevitably lead to famines and that while South Korea has become a truly modern country, the North may actually have declined since the end of the Korean War.

It's also somewhat anti-religious, as many communist regimes are. Yet Juche and deification of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il act almost as a substitute religion. A picture of one of the Kims is found in almost every building. Near-godlike powers are ascribed to the Eternal President and his son. The NatGeo documentary concluded that for North Koreans, fear and worship aren't such different things at all.

So while the governmental system may be unique, is the concept of a religion in which a primary motivating factor is fear also new? Not at all. In fact, fear may be more fundamental in the history of religion that the standard given answers. Many historians, trying to explain the universal religious impulse in humans have said that religion 'explains the natural world' or 'allows people to order their lives with regard to some higher organization'. I think that these reasons are important, but that fear is a fundamental part of primal religion that is often left out.

The fact is that even mainstream Christianity has a vocabulary of fear. Until recently, many people were self-described 'God-fearing' men and women. More apocalyptic versions have emphasized the terrible wrath of God's judgment. The best modern example of Christian fear is found in the last book of the Left Behind series, an evangelical account of the End Times in a trashy action-movie format. This last, The Glorious Appearing, has taken a lot of criticism because the returning Jesus is a judgmental conquerer who physically punishes the enemies of God. I see this not as a new development in Christianity but rather a hearkening back to pre-Christian ideas about deity.

Most religions in the modern world have toned down or muted the fear aspect. There is one historical example of a religion that, like Juche/Kim Worship, was based primarily on fear. That is the polytheism of ancient Sumer. Sumerian religion isn't well known, and most people have only barely heard of the Epic of Gilgamesh. It does reveal aspects of the religious system, however. Like Greco-Roman gods, the Sumerian gods each had a domain. They were flawed beings who ruled because they were powerful, not because they deserved to rule. They demanded sacrifices, which the people gave. Unlike Roman sacrifices, the Sumerians offered their not out of the hope of favor from a particular god but because the failure to do so would be horribly punished.

Sumerian religion is older as a systematized setup than Greco-Roman faith. It was also practiced in a much harsher climate. While maintaining many structures, all the polytheisms that eventually flowed from Sumer seem to have slowly toned down the role of fear in the relationships between gods and humans. Yet we should not forget that the Old Testament contains a healthy dosage of near-threats from God to his chosen people.

Then again, maybe North Korea's system is unique - it's one of the few religions in modern times to put fear front-and-center. However much certain strains of political Christianity have tried to inject 'fear' back into their theology, that aspect remains one of the more embarrassing for evangelists of this brand of Christianity. For one reason or another, fear-centric worship is rare and rather disliked in today's world.

What the hell is happening?

Barack Obama has been doing rather badly in recent polls. There are a few reason - the resurfacing of Rev. Wright, the larger-than-optimal loss in Pennsylvania, the possible association with certain Weathermen (Weathermans? I'm not entirely sure). But what's interesting is the Hillary Clinton, the obvious beneficiary of all this, isn't getting more popular. It's just that Obama's support is eroding. What this means is that if Clinton manages the nomination, she won't be any stronger against McCain for having defeated Obama.

McCain continues to be relatively quiet, saying some fuzzy things about health care and the current financial crisis. His solutions are disturbing for some Republicans because they tend to be much more comfortable with Big Government mechanisms that are often lambasted as 'Democractic' ideas.

Meanwhile, it seems that even Robert Mugabe's government in Zimbabwe is willing to say that the opposition won. Yet Morgan Tsvangirai claims he won 50.6%, which would mean he does not have to engage Mugabe in a direct run-off. Mugabe's government seems near to releasing results in which Tsvangirai won, but was under the 50% threshold. If Mugabe actually plans to relinquish the Presidency, he is not acting like it. I personally believe he won't give it up willingly and that he plans to intimidate the opposition and rig the vote in the run-off election. China has attempted to ship weapons - suspiciously ordered right after the first round of elections - into the country but South Africa and now Angola - a big Zimbabwe and China supporter - have prevented the goods from reaching Mugabe's men. Mugabe's government is currently recounting votes, possibly stalling for time while they try to obtain weapons.

And you know that food shortage we've been hearing about? Apparently it's struck hardest in repressive regimes like Zimbabwe and Egypt and Haiti. While I am not disregarding the human aspect of the shortage, the political aspect has caused the weakening of a number of vicious and illiberal regimes. Maybe this will make people reexamine their commitment to food aid for foreign countries where American grain may prevent famine at the expense of propping up an authoritarian.

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

What about Bush?

Over at Reason there's a discussion going on about the most overrated and underrated Presidents of all time. It's pretty predictable, with snarky libertarians taking the piss out of Reagan (liked for his economics, hated for his foreign policy) and Lincoln (who expanded wartime executive powers).

This got me thinking about President Bush. Commentators have speculated on what his legacy will be. Of course, a certain contingent will always find him the worst President of their lifetimes or even of all time. For the all time-worst I would pick James Buchanan, the man who directly proceeded Lincoln. If Lincoln overstepped his bounds and did unconstitutional things to win the war or squash dissent, Buchanan failed his oath of office by tacitly allowing secessionists to maneuver themselves into positions that would make some military confrontation inevitable for his successor.

But I digress. Now certain people are worried that if Iraq succeeds, Bush will be seen as a genius and that his history will be whitewashed. Exactly what a successful Iraq looks like is also up for debate. What I know is this: Iraq will not be settled within Bush's term. It will definitely be up to the next President to finish it in whatever way they do.

So what will Bush's legacy look like? I think history will record him thusly:
Immediately following 9/11, Bush enjoyed ridiculous levels of support (92%!). No human could maintain that level. If Jesus was President he couldn't keep his approval rating that high. The problem is not that his ratings fell afterwards but how ready Bush was to spend that political capital in divisive areas and how quickly it vanished.
The invasion of Iraq has three parts: convincing the public, winning the war and holding the territory. Convincing the public seemed to go over pretty well at the time. Approval for the war was about as high as any other modern-era war at its start. Bush seemed to be too much in a hurry though, which made it appear that he was set upon invading even if there were no weapons of mass destruction or a program to make them - which was the case that an obviously uncomfortable Colin Powell presented to the American public.

Once engaged, winning the war was easy. With the US military apparatus as it is now, I could even have won the war. I'm not saying I have any military skill, I'm saying that the US military is the best at what it does in the entire world.

Holding the territory and making something out of it is where Bush's legacy truly hinges. I think history will remember him thus: whatever the US ends in Iraq, Bush pursued a policy - even in the face of on-the-ground failures and much criticism - that very nearly made it impossible for any change in strategy to make anything of Iraq.

The point at which Bush's Iraq strategy changed most noticeably was after the 2006 midterm elections, which were heavily about Iraq and in which Bush received a "thumpin'". American have generally been most satisfied with government when the executive and legislative branches have belonged to different parties. While some would argue that the current congress had been relatively do-nothing, I think that the effect of a big loss, no matter how it was followed up, changed Bush's plans for Iraq. He substituted in new people who were not committed to the 'it will be easy' view of things. The new policy was slower, more pragmatic, more willing to make concessions.

If this is the policy that stabilizes Iraq and creates a democracy there, it won't be recorded as some massive work of genius on Bush's part. The policy congealed over literally three years, lacked real coherence until midway into the 'surge' and was produced more by events than by Bush's central planning.

I think this will be the legacy view of President Bush - that during his second term (especially since 2006) he saved Iraq from his own first term. Someday way into the future, archives will be available that will tell us exactly who knew what about Iraq and when. That will settle the debate about whether Bush's war pitch was a lie, and what the original goals for invading Iraq were. Until that time, I'm not worried that he'll be unduly canonized. There is no doubt that the Bush presidency has had far-reaching effects on the world, but if the War on Terror is not similarly pursued by the next President, Bush's terms may seem more of an aberration than a epoch-making event.

Monday, April 28, 2008

What is a religion?

I've been prompted to write about this for two reasons. One, a post at the Volokh Conspiracy, is titled Soldier sues army, saying his atheism led to threats. The other is the website Fundamentalists Say the Darndest Things, which I check from time to time.

While Volokh's discussion of possible unfair discrimination against atheists in the army is evenhanded, the quotes featured on FSTDT new are: it is a repository of things that are supposed to be far-out. It encourages a kind of distancing, since most of the quotes are from political Christians, and this allows us, as readers, to dismiss the entire movement as a 'bunch of crazy people'.

First, about the army. I don't doubt there are some people in the army command structure who want their soldiers to all be Christian. Some may promote this either by preferring Christians or discriminating against non-Christians. This has doubtless happened. This particular case, I am not entirely sure since I haven't read enough about it. And if something improper did occur, the army has a culture in which it rarely admits such mistakes. It will probably not do such a lot in this case, not because it shares a Christian agenda but because it does not appreciate outside pressure or transparency.

But is atheism, as so many commentators on FSTDT say, a religion? Basically the answer is "maybe." To know if something is a religion, we would have to define what 'religion' is. Yet I've never seen a satisfactory definition of religion in my life. I'm tempted to just ask atheists if it is religion, but no matter what they tell me, that won't solve it. Many Africans who practice traditional religions see these practices as part of their culture, not their religion. The entire term is so annoyingly subjective.

The fact is that atheism is a system of belief. It receives input from science and logic and reason, but so do other systems that we commonly consider religions. I can imagine atheists who are horrified as a say this but atheism may indeed be a religion. And so what if it is? There are wonderful arguments that patriotism forms a kind of civil religion, since it comprises a large number of the same functions as things we commonly see as religions (Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, etc.).

Eventually I will start a series of posts on various topics from FSTDT, simply because it captures a massively important part of American culture that just isn't given the serious appraisal it deserves.

Saturday, April 26, 2008

Alternate History #5: Roe v. Wade heads back to the states!

Recently, certain states in Mexico have begun to legalize abortion in increasing numbers of circumstances. Mexico is generally more culturally conservative than the US, but it has worked out a totally different system of federalism and states' rights for abortion. The central government won't dictate policy, and each state can set its own limits. The more developed, cosmopolitan states have begun to legalize more kinds of abortions.

Obviously there are opponents to this measure, but in the state which have legalized, these objectors - mainly religious Catholics - are seen as needlessly domineering. Could something similar have happened in the US?

Some people have argued that Supreme Court decisions dictate American culture - Brown v Board eliminated the validity of segregation which was still enjoying some popular support in the south. Yet sometimes Supreme Court decisions create opposition movements - Roe v Wade is the most obvious of these. Before Roe, abortion law in the US was a patchwork of permissive laws in liberal states to total restriction in the conservative ones to any number of moderate limitations in the Midwest.

When Roe made all US abortion law uniform by making it a right, it didn't change the culture the way Brown did. The reason for this difference escapes me - why did one decision make the result more popular, the other make it less popular? Both decisions were for generally liberal causes, done in the face of large opposition which was largely in the south. However, the difference between the cases does not change this fact: in Roe, a large number of states were dragged further to the political left in abortion law than they were willing to accept.

But what if the Supreme Court had decided that they couldn't form a majority opinion in Roe? What if they decided that any result would have been too divisive for both Court and Country? What if the Court had given a unanimous opinion that abortion policy was a state matter, not to be handled at the federal level?

Several things would change. First, I believe that a large amount of the power and popularity enjoyed by the pro-life movement comes, originally, from the top-down manner in which Roe imposed new law. Roe created a rally point - the number of religiously-motivated politicians vowing to 'overturn Roe' is proof of this. Without something both symbolic and federal, the pro-life movement could never have attained its current clout and power.

So in 1973, when abortion becomes a state matter, the laws are all over the place. What this means is that some states with total bans would border others with very slight restrictions. It's unlikely that laws prohibiting travel across state lines to procure abortion would have passed - they might be ruled unconstitutional by state or federal courts. This means that each state is not a 'black box' - people in restricted states could travel into a neighboring state if they wanted an abortion.

In an article about the Mexican state laws, the commentator, a rather utopian libertarian, pined that if Roe had gone back to the states, laws all around the nation would be much more liberal and acceptable. I think this is a bit naive, since it seems to assume that the wave of cultural conservatism starting in the 1980s, and possibly ending with this current election, would not have happened, or would be much weaker. I personally think Roe help the political Christian movement - always present but dormant until the 80s - come back into the mainstream. Roe woke up the religious conservatives but did not create them. What this means is that if abortion law was a state matter today, the red states might even be tightening their restrictions or banning the process entirely. To assume that, without Roe, abortion law would gradually 'progress' to liberal law is wrongheaded.

But in red states, where religious conservatives sought to ban all abortions, there might be an additional wrinkle. Even with Roe, certain states (I'm looking at you, South Dakota) have tried total bans anyway. If Roe was liberal overreaching at the federal level, there's no reason to think there wouldn't be conservative overreaching at the state level. In this alternate timeline, during the apogee of the conservative Christian movement certain states would have issued total bans and found their general population just as upset as people were over Roe. The reason abortion law becomes so contentious is that it is often settled by one side muscling its morality upon the other. This creates resentment, and the conservatives who tried total bans in their states would find that out for themselves.

My opinion is that by 2008, all or almost all state laws would allow abortions for rape, incest and the health of the mother. A great number would allow it fully, and a few states would have no parental consent laws for minors. Abortion law handled at the state level is less divisive and creates less hatred between pro-choice and pro-life. Plus it pushes the aggregate law towards moderation since any overstepping will cause an adverse reaction.

Friday, April 25, 2008

Alternate History #6: Ottoman Colonialism

The start of the colonial period, in the mid-1500s, was not a time of European supremacy. In fact, the Islamic Ottoman Empire might have been the most powerful force in the world. China was also strong, but far away. There was a viable Iranian Safavid Empire, and a forming Empire in Mughal north India. The Europeans were the ones who colonized for a few reasons:
  1. Their ships could reach the other lands
  2. They built trading empires which liked the goods colonization could bring
  3. They were geographically placed to send many expeditions
  4. They had the wealth to do all this

China fulfills all but the first; they could build better ships, but those kinds of ships were sometimes banned or their voyaging paths restricted. The Islamic Empires fulfill all but the first and third. However, massive ocean-going ships would have been copied from Europeans...if the Islamic Empires had had need of them.

What really changed things was the European control of Gibraltar. The Ottomans couldn't leave the Mediterranean. So how might things have come out differently? Until the very late 1400s, there was an Islamic power controlling southern Spain. If it had somehow held out for another hundred years, it would have afforded safe passage to Muslim ships seeking the Atlantic - specifically Ottoman ones.

In schools, children are taught that the Muslims were pushed out so the Spanish kingdom could be unified. This means that it's unlikely that a Muslim state - Grenada - could have survived as Spain's power rose. Yet the Spanish rulers did not find it necessary to control Portugal in order to 'complete' their country. Yes, Portugal was also Catholic, but the rules had found in necessary to consume the various other Catholic factions of Spain. What I mean by this is that the conception of 'complete' Spain was relatively arbitrary; had the rules been more concerned with French encroachment, or regional separatism, or Portuguese land-grabs, they might not have had time for Grenada.

So Grenada survives. The Ottomans, at that moment trading heavily with Italian powers, get and copy maps of the new world. We have one of those maps, the oldest to accurately map the coast of Brazil. It has captions on it which basically amount to "There are good lands out there and we should go seek them." If, as some would argue, there is no overseas-colonial instinct in the Ottoman world, I would use this map to argue there was.

Where might the Ottomans have colonized? My first guess would be West Africa and the entire western coast of Africa. While the Ottoman slave system was different from the chattel-slave system in West Africa, there were other Islamic (and Eastern European) powers who might have been very willing to take an influx of slaves. There had been an experiment in plantation slavery (like the southern USA) in souther Arabia early in Islamic history, but the Zanj (Black) Revolt had ended the systematic enslavement of East Africans. West Africans, taken far from home and disoriented, might have been easier to control. A large plantation-based system might arise in Iran and south Arabia, but would not likely prosper within the Ottoman lands themselves.

Seeking to keep its sea lanes open, the Ottomans would become heavily involved in politics between Grenada and Spain. When Spain, hoping to cut of the Ottomans and solidify Christian rule over the Peninsula, attacked Grenada, the Ottomans send a massive fleet and army. Spain is beaten back, and Grenada becomes a puppet of the Empire. Ottoman access is never endangered again, as Spain fears a Portuguese-Ottoman alliance if it tries to take Grenada.

Once colonies in West Africa were set up, the Ottomans might have either settled down or kept on sending ships out. I think that once the instinct sets in, they would have kept going. Central America would have been totally under Spanish control; the Ottomans would have sought to balance this. It is possible that South America, or at least the coasts, would be filled with Ottoman traders. North America, especially New England and Canada, would have been cold and unpleasant; the Ottomans might have wanted to keep the southern US and the extremely profitable Caribbean islands, however.

Many European states prohibited slavery on their own soil but allowed and financed it in the New World. The Ottomans might have set up slave systems in the islands and south, much like the ones Europeans set up. By the time France and England began to seriously try to colonize, the continents would have been claimed by Spain and the Ottomans. The only open zone would be in the northern US and Canada, where England was most successful at setting up permanent settlements.

Obviously, attempts to convert the natives to Islam would have been undertaken; the Ottomans in this period had great tolerance for Christians and Jews, but not for polytheistic pagans. The conversion mission might have been even more important to Muslims than Christians, since Muslim empires are very concerned with getting their citizens to worship only one god - no Islamic empire has long allowed a substantial portion of its population to remain pagan/shamanistic/polytheistic.

Ottoman influence would extend down along the coast of Africa. If it reached the Cape, it would have cut off the zone that the Dutch and English used to access their colonies in Asia. If the Ottomans controlled southern Africa well enough, the Europeans might never have been able to station and supply enough troops to take India.

The world would then look like this: Portugal, Netherlands have lands in Asia, mostly islands. Ottomans have some control over the African coast but not inland, as well as the Brazilian coast and southern North America. These zones would be converted to Islam, and would probably speak both their original languages and some dialect of Turkish. They would all use the Arabic writing system, though not many could actually speak the Arabic language. Spain would be worried as hell about messing with Grenada, but would be flush with gold from Central America.

Maybe sometime I will write up a possible Chinese/Japanese colonial race, since that could also have happened if a few things had happened differently.

A Four-Party America?

For a politician to advocate lower taxes, they must also be pro-life. For a candidate to support affirmative action they must also support environmental regulations on businesses. The fact that the US has only two viable political parties makes it nearly impossible for anyone to deviate too far from the central platform on any issue. In these examples, there is no good reason why supporting on requires supporting the other.

There are actually a number of different strains in American politics. If we had a parliament instead of an executive/legislative balance, they would split into four or more parties within a couple elections. Let's take a look at what these parties actually are:

Fiscal Responsibles:
mostly they vote Republican, but don't like the moralizing or war affinity. Generally oppose any social programs or anything that gives money to the government. For lower taxes most of the time, but a principled FR might support raising taxes to pay off a budget deficit inherited from a previous government.

Christian Wing: the other major sector of the Republicans, more approving of foreign policy 'agendas' and highly demanding on the social front. Various goals include condemning oppression of Christians worldwide, abstinence education, regulation of TV/internet content, and pro-life goals. Economics is not a priority for this party, as social policy was not for the FR.

Civil Rightists: A traditionally Democratic group, they have become even more so under President Bush's various suspensions of assumed rights. Anti-censorship, often interested in fair prison sentences and even drug decriminalization. Mostly opposed to adventures abroad, unless the US makes up only a small part in a multilateral operation. Basically the opposite of the CW; economic policy is not a priority once again.

Equality and Justice: The economic sector of the Democrats. Protectionist and neoliberal at the same time, they like the social programs set up by FDR and Johnson, but want to reform them to fit the current era. Bill Clinton is their most obvious success. Highly concerned with minority issues, they also support extensive foreign policy, along the lines of Bosnia, not Iraq.

These are the four major types of political thought in America, but they've been lassoed together so that a Civil Rightist has to end up supporting the agenda of an Equality&Justice candidate, or vice versa. Meanwhile these categories aren't perfect but the ideas in each do make more sense as a package than our current setup.

So how would a hypothetical four party system work? The parties would have to form coalitions. These could be the same kind that we currently see - CW and FR, CR and E&J. But there are lots of other ways to organize the parties, and the current setup is not self-evidently the best one. A FR+CR coalition would be a libertarian's wet dream. An E&J+CW coalition would be wonderful for compassionate Christians (not Compassionate Conservatives specifically but those who like overseas promotion of American values as well as well-funded public social and education programs).

The point is not that the parties should split like this, but that these are the big strands of American politics. If the US government was organized differently, they might be viable. I think that our executive-headed system makes it difficult for more than two parties to grow very large, at least for more than one election.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

I was right (enough) about Pennsylvania

It was kinda boring except when early polls said Obama might win. So Clinton won by ten points. She picked up 15 delegates at most, meaning she's only behind by 130 now. Maybe if she's reached that 12-point win, it really would've meant something. A bunch of people predicted Obama wouldn't get over 43%; he got 45%.

Both Democrats still beat McCain in Pennsylvania, so Clinton's assertion that Obama can't win big states does not make sense in this case.

I really had hoped for something spectacular to happen, but it's two steps forward two steps back. I might just swear off posting about the Democrats until they sort this thing out.

Why is black America so different?

Bill Cosby complains about it. He wrote a book chastising black Americans for not living up to the potential given to them. The book is called "Come on People!" Unfortunately, he didn't notice that there should be a comma there. The book went to print as "Come on People!" instead of the (clearer) "Come on, People!"


I've talked about how blacks are more likely to get abortions because they are more often in the financial/relationship situations that make women want to get abortions. The question I've never gotten around to is why this status is the case.

If I could answer it simply, I'd have a wonderful solution all packaged for you. Unfortunately the explanation I find most convincing is so nuanced that I have not idea how to change the situation. The man who explains the problems of gangs, drugs, pregnancy and educational/achievement failure in black communities is Elijah Anderson. I read his book, Code of the Street, two years ago and had a number of conversations with people about the ideas.

He bases the book of off immense amounts of case-study research. A single case study is just an anecdote, but a lifetime of them is better than any survey or statistical analysis because such 'hard math' often fails when applied to sociological issues.

Anderson has one gigantic idea from which many of the problems in black communities can be derived. I call it the 'shortened time horizon'. For one reason or another, African-Americans in poor communities do not consider a long scope of time ahead of their present position.

This might sound like some simple, subtly racist idea: "blacks can't think ahead and plan."
That's not it at all, and if you think that's what I mean, please read the book.

The point is that a huge web of factors cause it to be impossible to get enough time perspective to create large change within a community. Only certain select people can save themselves from this - personal redemption only, like in The Wire, which is easily in the same vein.

Here's an example of how interconnected the whole mess is: Anthony grew up without a father, raised mostly by his grandmother. None of the other men around him have jobs besides selling drugs or gang-related activity. That's because all the jobs are far away from the ghetto where Anthony lives, and you have to move out to get one that's worthwhile. Within the community, living to 35 is a blessing for a man. The school Anthony goes to is full of kids who don't give a shit about learning because they don't expect to use anything they've learned in school. Even if Anthony wanted to learn, there are social pressures against it (acting white - which is often overstated in my opinion) and failing that his classmates have disrupted the whole idea of school so totally that no one but a real, gifted teacher can hook more than a few kids. When Anthony goes home he sees his mom come home from one of her several, very low-paying jobs. He expects, just like everyone else around him, that he'll be dead within ten to fifteen years. He needs or wants money, for his family or just for himself. There is a way to get it - he sees people making easy money selling drugs. Most of them get killed eventually, but he'll be killed anyway before long and the money is important.

This isn't exactly taken from Anderson's book, but the basic idea is: there is a huge set of social, cultural and institutional factors that all do one thing: make everyone within them pessimistic about the future. Maybe this sounds too neat and tidy, as if having a sunnier outlook could cure gang violence. The lack of role models is especially important. No, black sports-players don't count. I might even argue they detract, giving people a chance to lie to themselves about whether they can become real athletes and not work towards a living the way most people do. When I say role models, I don't mean it in the normal sense, but in the sense that Anderson uses it: if you don't live near anyone who has a real, steady job that supports them, it's easy to imagine a hopelessness setting in.

The shortened time horizon not only explains poverty and gang-drug connections, but also alarming numbers of single parents and very young mothers. Seeking to prove themselves under social pressure (just like anyone) young black women try to form attachments to men around them - who might be gang members simply because of the statistics of it - and the way they do this is with sex. The downsides of having a child young mostly lie in the far future - the costs aren't always apparent. Anderson makes the argument so much better, but I've tried to summarize a few bits here.

Code of the Street uses a few concepts such as reputation and shortened time horizon to explain most of the peculiarities of black America. He applies it to conspicuous consumption, consumption beyond one's means, violent bravado, and on and on. One thing he doesn't do - and maybe he doesn't know the answer - is explain why and how the institutions he analyzes came into being in the first place.

He also does not go into the specific contours of gangs and drugs, which are often the most incomprehensible part to outside observers. What's interesting to note is that as more Hispanics move into the US, ones that settle in areas near or similar to ghettos begin to develop a Hispanic-inflected culture that is very similar to the black one Anderson describes. This suggests, but doesn't prove, that the environment in which a culture survives is very important in how it defines goals and time horizons.

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Pennsylvania - maybe something interesting can come out of this

Winner still undecided. Looks closer than I had predicted though.

Interesting thing from CNN exit polls:
Obama won those who never go to church and those who go more than once a week. Clinton won the moderate - once a week to once a month churchgoers. Sarcasm: Can Obama unite the highly religious and highly secular against the moderate middle?

Another thing:
Among voters who said gender was important in picking a candidate, 70% went for Hillary. I know its an exit poll, and I know people lie. But this is a much larger margin than any random act of lying could create. We've heard all the arguments about people not wanting a woman CiC because she'd get hormonal, or that women are weaker or less decisive. Apparently, the real gender aspect works the other direction. Maybe a longer analysis later.
(only 21% said gender mattered to them; those who didn't care nearly split between Clinton and Obama)

More on Blacks & Abortion from TVV

TheValuesVoter, the author of the post which I critiqued a while back, has posted several comments on this blog. One is the series of statistics I had mentioned in that critique. These stats continue to uphold my assertion that black people in America find themselves in the situations that cause people to want abortions more frequently than whites or other groups do. This accounts, I would argue, for the imbalance in abortion rates between communities - not some plan to slow the growth of the black population or some ill-defined idea of 'coercion' that TVV sometimes talks about.

I'd like to take an opportunity to talk about another of TVV's posts on the subject, one comparing the unacknowledged personhood of slaves to the unacknowledged personhood of fetuses/embryos/whatever word you want to use.

The big quote to critique:

They're not pro-abortion. They're pro-choice!! And to the people who would reply this way, there is some huge difference in the two.

Let me try to quickly explain why there isn't really any.

Unfortunately, the justification boils down to the following: slavery was bad, and slaves weren't seen as people. Thus, another case where something seen by only certain persons as 'human' is also wrong.

There can be a huge variance between what you think about 'conception and such' and the response you give to the question, "Are you pro-choice?" This reminds me of Presidential Candidate Santos on the last season of the West Wing, who was pro-choice in most respects but believed abortion to be murder. He gained this belief from his religious values, and he asserted that it wasn't his place to let his religious values guide his policies.

There's something vaguely unhinged behind TVV's little essay, which does a good job of picking out quotes that make it seem like an easy equation between living slaves and living fetuses. But when does like begin? I will answer that question: I don't know. We don't know and can't know scientifically right now. If life did begin at conception, and you could prove it to me, I'd have to think differently than I do now. If your only proof is a religious idea or a suspicion, I cannot accept it in determining my opinion.

And for all you feminists out there, I haven't left out the concerns of the mother because she's not important. I just wanted to answer TVV on his own terms on the subjects he talks about. But, coming soon, an alternate history in which Roe V. Wade is...dismissed.

Monday, April 21, 2008

Pennsylvania primary boring

It's not that exciting, really. Hillary Clinton needs a victory by 10-12 points to really have a chance at a Superdelegate-stolen nomination (which wouldn't happen anyway, so never mind). She's going to beat Obama by six to eight points. That gains her 15 to 30 delegates on Obama, who leads by at least 140 delegates. Even if Hillary really pulls it out at the last minute and wins by 15 points, than big chunk of gained delegates will be equalized in North Carolina, where Obama will win by more than 10 points (maybe as high as 20). At that point the situation will be the same as it is right now.

If Obama pulls off a close loss - within five points of Clinton, I think - then there will be another round of "Hillary, please drop out" op-eds in the papers. A debate performance generally regarded as hostile and lackluster did not damage Obama, and didn't help Clinton either. Not much has changed in a long time. This political situation is stuck on a treadmill, and Clinton is running low on endurance.

I almost hope something important happens tomorrow, just so I can be wrong and have a chance to explain why I was wrong.

Only one good thing has come from this Pennsylvania mess for the democrats: whichever one wins, the nominee will have a very good chance to beat McCain in this crucial state.

The historiography of grand strategy computer games (aka. the most boring title ever for a post)

I have been playing a computer game recently, and it's good. It's addictive and eats up time. It's called Europa Universalis, and it's one of the most complicated and historiographically acceptable of any of the 'conquer the world' games I've played yet. The combat of armies, the loose political organization, the factoring in of culture and religion in a non-trivial way all make for a fun but also acceptably historical game. It's nothing like another favorite of mine, Medieval: Total War, which makes each playable faction out to be an empty container that can build a massive force and steamroll across Europe regardless of culture and religion.

But amid all this is a disturbing little nugget: the way that EU calculates the rate at which your government researches technology exposes two important ideas about how nations advance, both of which are faulty.

First, advances in technology - from governmental forms to new types of military to better trading practices - come about only by direct investment from the player. Since you play as the central government of your faction, this seems to be telling us that governments create innovation, and that advances are made only this way. I give the developers a huge amount of leeway since they had to think of some system, and even if they didn't mean this, I must discuss it.
Most large advances in any area of technology came from individual or group (though not always private) experimentation or thought. They did not come from governments pouring big buckets of money into an idea. This only began to happen when new technology became expensive. The first big tech breakthrough totally made by governments was, in my opinion, the atomic bomb. There is only one other big breakthrough since then: spaceflight. Some would even argue that the government spaceflight programs are a dead end, marking not a breakthrough but a hobbled mistake that needs to be ditched. The major breakthroughs until then, from Longbows and heavy armor for knights and horses to powered flight to electronic components were mostly free of government funds. Most great political thinkers weren't subsidized.

The second problem with EU's historiography is again about technological research. In the complicated formula determining how quickly an area of research is completed, there is a variable based on which major culture group your faction belongs to. Based on which group you belong to, your research speed gets multiplied by a number. The groups and their values are:
  • Latin (Western Europe): 1.0
  • Eastern (Eastern Europe): 0.9
  • Muslim: 0.8
  • Indian (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh): 0.5
  • Chinese (and Southeast Asia): 0.4
  • African: 0.2
  • New World: 0.1
Well if that isn't Eurocentric and condescending! This feature actually wasn't required to make the game playable, unlike my first complaint. Even taking the actual values very lightly, there is a startling downplaying of New World tech and ideological prowess. Africa likewise gets shafted. The game begins in 1453, when Muslims, not Westerners, were the preeminent culture group. China's technology rivaled Europe's for maybe another two centuries.

What this means is that by the time you being to colonize as a European faction, the African and New World ones are pushovers. Your troops cut them to bits and settle on their lands. There are, however, good arguments to be made that New World tech was actually much more advanced in some areas than European kinds. The bows Amerinds made were superior to European bows and guns, and hardened leather armor they used could actually repel bullets up until better methods were found in the 1840s.

This game, like almost every other I've played, seems dead set on explaining that Europe really was the best in most every way. It's nearly impossible to play as a New World faction, and I (playing as England) ripped apart an Amerind alliance of three nations comprising the entire Southern US, then without stopping conquered all of Mexico and Central America. From this game, it's pretty evident that a kind of Eurocentric and imperialist attitude to history still exists.

(For more on Amerind sophistication, read 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus. Charles Mann is an amazing popularizer of real, substantial history.)

Friday, April 18, 2008

Refining my ideas on China, with thanks to xiaoyong

A commenter here named xiaoyong has said some interesting things about my posts on China, the wider world, and Tibet. I know nothing about this person except that they are Chinese and that English is not their first language. They made some good points, though sometimes I couldn't understand what they were trying to say.

When they made their first comment, I wanted to write something snarky like, "someone responds to posts about China overreacting by...overreacting." But there are some good points in there: China did raise the standard of living for many of its citizens. Tibet was a backwater before China took over. These things are true, but we need to have a discussion over whether the human rights violations required to obtain them were worth it.

I may have been overly harsh in characterizing the Chinese people, but I stand by my idea that an international diplomatic culture has not yet developed among the citizenry. This means that in the face of criticism, the Chinese are more likely to huddle together in nationalism and not respond fully. Plus, calling people who try to put out the Olympic Torch terrorists does not help mellow the image.

Obviously, xiaoyong is a proud Chinese nationalist. That's fine, and they do notice that people overreact and find it embarrassing. What I would ask of this person is to note the bad things that China has done and continues to do. No country is perfect, least of all the US. We have a history of slavery, problems with religious, racial and gender equality and a host of other things. I love to critique the US. When I ask my country to be better, it shows I am a part of it. I hope that Chinese citizens can find an opening to do the same and not whitewash their own past.

Thursday, April 17, 2008

Tibet, and more on childish China

Ah, Facebook. That place where everyone under 25 spends at least twice as much time as they want to. It's the place where you can find the most unintelligent debate on any subject. Girls asking if, as a Catholic, she can call herself a Christian. People asking if Obama is a secret Muslim who prays to idols and shouts 'Allahu Akbar!'

And then we get to the Tibet groups. There is the obvious Free Tibet group. There is the Tibet IS China group. But last of all, there is the most interesting. It is the group called "Tibet WAS, IS AND WILL ALWAYS BE a part of China." It has some 23,000 members. It is the most virulent pit of childishness and petty attacks that I have seen (save a few groups directed against Bush and a few against abortion). Now I know that what's said on facebook is exaggerated and often intentionally so, but I think that the constant overreaction of Chinese nationalists is yet another symptom of the lack of a worldwide diplomatic culture in China.

The group is mostly in English, otherwise I couldn't read it. One section is: "An applaud to Jin Jing for her valiant effort to protect the torch in Pairs and shame to the terrorists who attacked her." There we have it. Protesters trying to put forward a political point (in an inflammatory and probably illegal way) aren't just wrong. Neither are they simple lawbreakers. They're terrorists! I could make a joke about how only China is more willing to label people as terrorists than the USA...wait, I already made it.

What I really wanted to do was critique the name of the group. It makes three claims:
  1. Tibet was part of China (presumably in the past)
  2. Tibet is part of China
  3. Tibet will always be part of China
Tibet was part of China: This one is the hardest to talk about, simply because I don't know what 'was' means. There have been many periods in history where Tibet was independent of China. The traditional zone of China rarely extends as far inland as Tibet. Most of the Chinese Empires were more coastal. That deals with the far past. How about the near history? Until the late 1950s, Tibet was independent. Whatever the status of the people - poor, oppressed, etc - it does not change the fact that Tibet was not a part of China, at least de facto, less than sixty years ago. So the first claim is false, Tibet has not always been part of China. It is culturally related, but not the same. It is ethnically related, but not the same.

Tibet is part of China: Yeah, of course it is. No one would argue with this. Some people would say that it should not be, but that's normative. This claim is descriptive.

Tibet will always be part of China:
I don't know how to assess a statement that must apply throughout all time. Besides, if something will go on forever that does not necessarily make it good or acceptable. Inequality and unfairness will go on forever, but they are neither good nor acceptable.

The reason I went through the name is that is becomes some sort of slogan for pro-China groups. There are ten groups with variations on this slogan, which does nothing to attempt to convince people who don't already believe. It's childish to suppose that saying this over and over will do anything but make undecided people suspicious of the seeming craziness of the slogan itself. Besides, for a group that finds history so important it's pretty historically inaccurate.

Wednesday, April 16, 2008

China whines, "Why can't we force people to like us?!"

This whole long mess over Tibet and human rights abuses, brought to a head by the Olympics, demonstrates one important thing: China is an economic power, but not a mature country.

What I mean by this is that Chinese citizens and politicians and diplomats and businessmen have been isolated from the world for so long that they have absolutely no idea how to respond to people disliking them. Of all the expressions of nationalism I have seen, China's is the most hair-raisingly unthinking. The Chinese people have not developed a cultural system to deal with being criticized by other countries.

France floated ideas about a boycott over the Tibet violence, and Chinese citizens reacted by trying to organize a total boycott of French goods. Now, you might point out that French opposition to the Iraq war almost resulted in a harrowing 'Freedom Fries' schism. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the American overreaction and the Chinese. The US wanted support on specific policies, France refused. China wanted other countries to like and respect it, and France refused.

The American reaction was citizens registering displeasure because they felt France was wrong. The Chinese wanted to force France to like them by hitting them with an economic club. They did not want diplomatic relations, or the kind of 'friendship' the US enjoys with, say, Saudi Arabia. They wanted to be liked as a country and a people by the French country and people.

What it does is make China look idiotic. And it happens over and over: another country expresses displeasure at China and gets a huge nationalist backlash from the Chinese. China's big debut on the world stage may go over without violence, but its citizens are building a nasty reputation for themselves as the most childish of all great powers. The 'mature' Europeans often scoff at American enthusiasm and hotheadedness, but even the worst of Americans are being made to look measured and thoughtful by the Chinese reactions.

The USSR never had this problem, even as it far more despised by the West. Neither is it a problem of being non-European. Japan does not constantly overreact. South Korean has indeed had its missteps, but more often than not they're things like attempting to apologize for the Virginia Tech killings, simply because the shooter was Korean. Venezuela does not go crazy when important US spokesmen insult Hugo Chavez.

I suspect that if Kim Jong-Il's regime collapsed tomorrow, the North Koreans would have a similar problem to the Chinese: they've been out of the loop of global discourse for so long, they don't understand how to respond. Eventually the Chinese will toughen up and learn to either take criticism or change. For right now, citizens may be undermining the Chinese government's claim that it's ready to stand tall on the world stage.

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

McCain hasn't spoken yet...to his benefit right now

McCain is either leaded or close behind Obama or Clinton in head-to-head polls. Over the past number of weeks, the margins between him and the Dems have fluctuated, but I noticed something important: they only move based on what the Democrats do.

When Clinton looks down, she loses ground versus McCain. When Obama says something dumb, he moves down versus McCain. Nothing McCain has done or said has effected the polls one way or the other. That's because he's not done anything of note since becoming the nominee except some small foreign policy gaffes that most Americans didn't hear about and don't care about. Right now, McCain looks like he's tried to portray himself - a maverick, centrist Republican who's not afraid to stand up to his party. The fact is that, as much as he has stood up to his own party, his political positions are pretty generic. Right now he looks like he could be a change candidate, and well-qualified to lead. I'm not disputing the fact that many people see him as most qualified, but his image of renewal can only wear away once he opens his mouth versus the final Democratic nominee.

Something like 15-25% of Democrats say they'll vote for McCain if their candidate doesn't get the nomination. They may think so right now, but Clinton and Obama aren't much different on policy. The big split is in their personalities and styles, with Hillary representing the 'old power' with experience to start right away, and Obama the 'new thinking' that might let American get over partisan woes. The faithful may think they'll go for McCain, but when he becomes known - as a slightly rebellious Republican, but a solidly Republican candidate - these 'party traitors' will change their minds. Not all of them, of course, but a number.

Plus, the head-to-head polls already factor the protest vote for McCain. As Democratic protest votes drop away from McCain, he will fall at least a few points. Since Obama will be the nominee, and he is tied or up 2 points on McCain, expect him to gain 3-5 points on McCain over the course of a few weeks after the nomination. Of course, Obama will also lose the support of some moderates once he gets the nomination, since he'll have to open his mouth just like McCain. Maybe the 3-5 point bump won't show up, but I will be willing to bet money that a poll the day before the election asking Clinton supporters if they're voting McCain in protest will show that 25% of them didn't defect. Maybe 5%. Maybe 10%. I don't even think it will go that high.

Monday, April 14, 2008

Laicite versus Separation

The United States has a political philosophy of separation of church and state. The US government (specifically congress) may make "no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". This is from the First Amendment, probably the most important for preserving rights in America, and a personal favorite of mine. This doctrine has been interpreted to mean that the US takes no sides in religious disputes, that it does not legislate something because it is religious (though debate over legislating semi-religious morality is ongoing) and does not ever ever EVER promote a religion of inhibit another. Of course, the US often fails in the these goals, but they are an idea to live up to not a template from which the US will be docked points. Despite ahistorical assertions protestations by those who want a larger role for Christianity, the Separation doctrine is the current law of the land.

France and Turkey are examples of another philosophy of secularism. I believe that secularism of some form is the best way of organizing a democracy and modern government. Turkey draws its tradition of secularism directly and explicitly from France, which created this philosophy, laicite (actually laïcité but I don't want to spend ten years typing out diacritics). Laicite arose during the French First Republic, which tried to change the governmental order so completely that it made many Europeans sure the End Times were near.

Laicite is not Separation; it is a policy of 'active noninterference' on the part of the state. This leads France to seriously contemplate banning headscarves in its universities, as they are a religious symbol. Laicite prefers religion and religious activities to be private (in the sense that they're not state-supported) and private (in the sense that they take place out of the public eye). Turkey is similarly inclined.

Now which of these philosophies is theoretically superior for maintaining secularism? If the 'active noninterference' of laicite were always carried out by a just government (as defined by whose standards?) then the two might be near-equals. My argument is that Separation is more universal and laicite is more discretionary, which means that Separation can more easily balance between secularism and freedom of religion.

First off, laicite is indeed discretionary: the government must positively decide to act to preserve secularism. This means that sometimes it will not act. The government action will have a stated purpose: the headscarf ban construes the wearing of scarfs with Islamic denigration of women. However, some Muslim women see the headscarf as a thing of pride since it was originally for Muhammad's wives. It is, to them, respectful and superior to wear a scarf. By banning the headscarf in universities, laicite has cut into religious freedom.

This is not to say that Separation does not sometimes abridge religious freedom. Of course it does. Rules for the slaughtering of animals, or the possession of items the government designates as 'drugs' do indeed curtail some religious traditions. That is sad, sometimes bigoted, and unfortunately unavoidable to some extent.

The difficultly that laicite has to cope with, which Separation avoids, is discretion. Sometimes, a laicite-style government will choose not to act. Have crucifixes been banned in universities, seeing as Jesus advocated nonviolent overthrow of the state economic system? Some would argue Jesus did such a thing, and so a call to ban symbols of his teaching would not be impossible under laicite. Even in more subtle situations, the government may not act. My argument, sure to be accepted by anyone cynical enough to read this post, is that when choosing to act/not act, a laicite government will overall prefer the religious interference of whatever faith is the majority in the country at the expense of minority faiths.

Separation avoids this fate by have a default position of non-action, and by creating a dynamic tension between many different faith groups. If the government tries to curtail the religious freedoms of, say, the Seventh Day Adventists it will be more obvious that this action is targeted. There is a reason that the greatest court cases in favor of religious liberty were all won by Jehovah's Witnesses. Much like the distinction between unitary and federal states, the Separation doctrine makes assaults on any one group much more visible by all the groups, and more likely to be opposed.

Both systems are superior to a non-secular system, but within secular systems Separation more easily preserves both secularism and religious freedom.

To sum it up in a just-so-story kind of way:
The USA got religion right, France and Turkey slightly off, Iran got it wrong.

Sunday, April 13, 2008

The False False Flag: Why I never paid much attention to the 9/11 Truth movement

Q&O has a small article making fun of Richard Falk, just chosen by the UN to talk about human rights in the Israel-Palestine conflict. What the post points out is that Prof. Falk is also sympathetic to/involved in the 9/11 Truth movement. It argues, and I agree, that this makes him a suspicious and not very good choice to investigate the human rights mess he's been assigned.

9/11 Truthers believe one of a number of things. Either the Twin Towers were blown up by the government or someone working for them, or the hijacking plan was known but not stopped to further certain interests. These are the two most moderate theories. There are others, like the idea that lasers from either aliens or satellites destroyed the Towers, or that the Towers were 'transported' away and not destroyed.

A big chunk of the US population thinks the Truthers are on to something. The number of believers ranges from 10% (probably about right) to 50-60% in some clearly alarmist surveys. These people don't necessarily accept Truther methods or even conclusions, but they think there's something vital the government won't reveal. Here's the real truth: there is indeed material and records the government won't reveal, but that material is not going to be vital to understanding 9/11.

We really do know the important stuff already: President Bush got a security briefing mentioning a possible terrorist attack by airplane. The Twin Towers had been targeted years earlier. The Pentagon is also an obvious place to hit. By some failed bureaucracy and a sense of 'this can't happen here,' Americans and the Administration failed to anticipate and take action against such a terror plot. Terrorist captured planes, used them before a coherent response could be formulated. The Towers were weakened by the hits, and they fell, killing more than 3000 people in total.

That's the vital information. That's the outline. There's nothing in this outline that pretends to know 'why' certain people did what they did. Since we can't reach inside their minds, we will never actually know why people did certain things. One big Truther mistake is to think they can do just that. They 'know' what Bush, or Bin Laden, or the international Zionist Conspiracy was thinking.

A lot of Truther support comes from this feeling of "How could they let this happen?" We're told the US is the most powerful country, but it was hurt by eighteen guys with sharp objects and flight training. What this view misses is that the US is a massive leviathan of interlocking systems, not a centralized and unitary item. Each bit can make a small mistake, and over time these add up to a large security hole.

The moral of the entire story is not to simply dismiss the Truthers but to understand that, given the choice between an act of stupidity and an act of malice, assume stupidity until you have perfect evidence to prove otherwise.